Yet the few concrete precedents-of the late sixth century and 446-were at best inexact, at worst frankly discouraging and in the event Spartan strategy, in so far as it was determined by the dogma, was shown to have been null and void ab initio. But since the Persian Wars of 480/79 it had been dogma, both inside and outside the Spartan alliance, that such an invasion was the most potent means of compelling Athens to fulfil her enemies' will. Admittedly the majority of Athenian citizens-and perhaps even the senior Spartan king and general Archidamos- did not share this belief. I will also show that the Mounted Lancers, the Companion Cavalry, and the Foot Companions of the phalanx, even under Alexander, were not invariably armed with the sarissa but frequently used the spear and javelin.Īt the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 most Greeks believed that, if Sparta led her allies by land to ravage Attika, Athens would be unable to hold out for more than three years at the most (Thuc. and that the infantry lance may not have been used in battle before the reign of Alexander the Great. In a second article, entitled 'Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon,' I will argue that Philip employed the cavalry lance for the first time at Chaeronea in 338 B.C.

Finally, I will consider how the Macedonians carried and wielded the cavalry lance and argue that this weapon was employed against not only hostile cavalry but even infantry. Third, I will discuss the sarissa as an infantry weapon and show in what respects the Macedonian phalanx differed from the older Greek hoplite formation. Second, I will show that both literary and archaeological sources indicate that the Macedonian hypaspists normally employed the spear, hoplite shield, and related equipment. First, I shall consider the precise specifications of the Macedonian sarissa and its concomitant small target in comparison with those of the traditional Greek hoplite spear and shield. Moreover, to gain a proper perspective on the limited role played by sarissa-armed foot, one must examine the evidence for the continued use of the hoplite panoply by the Macedonians. When it is established how the sarissa had to be handled, then one can conceive more accurately both the advantages and weaknesses of military formations armed in this manner.

To understand these developments, it is necessary to be clear about the limitations of size and weight of the sarissa, since these factors determined how the weapon could be wielded in battle. Practical phalanx mechanics as a means to shed light on preexisting sources.Īdoption of the sarissa, or long lance, by Macedonian infantry and cavalry brought about important changes in military tactics. Involved the current effort, however, will have the advantage of providingįirsthand observations that supply simple and rational explanations of As with any modern recreation, a certain amount of guesswork is Sources with hands on experience, in this case by actually going out andĪrming a volunteer phalanx on a small scale to see what is both possible and Will provide fresh insight into such details by combining a survey of existing It is hoped that the current investigation Of period (or near period) authors that potentially shed light on such these Shield provided physical cover to the soldier on one's immediate left areĭetails that have remained largely unexplored. Weapons, could the second or third ranks engage the enemy and if the hoplite The stance which individuals took and how farĪpart they stood from their compatriots, the position in which the held their Yet despite this, there is a relatively poor understanding of howĪ phalanx actually worked. Its organization, supply, evolution and social effects has been covered many Historians and military tacticians alike. The Greek phalanx has been a subject of study for generations of both

Hoplite shield refrence